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“Government As The Integrator” 
(GATI) is now preferred approach
Incentives among contractors may 
not align with program objectives
Poor contractor cooperation causes 
delays, overruns, poor performance
Government is still learning how to 
“play” the “game” of GATI acquisition
Solution
Align contractor incentives using 
customized incentive mechanisms
Combine different incentive 
mechanisms to be more effective
Contractors acting in their interests 
also serves program interests
Approach
Describe & analyze GATI contractor 
incentives using game theory
Use agent-based modelling to 
quantify the game outcomes
Simulate incentive mechanisms in 
context of a full acquisition program
Select the most promising 
combinations of mechanisms 
Future Work
Interview acquisition program staff to 
gather data
Pilot most promising mechanisms 
and measure results
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until year after next
Situation: Sensitive electronics in 
missiles degrade over time—
unusable in five years
Decision: 
Cruise missile PMO proceeds with 
production/deployment
Rationale: Cruise missile PMO can 
now claim to meet schedule
Result: 
Significant portion of expensive 
missile’s expected life is lost
Moral Hazard: Cruise missile PMO benefits themselves at expense of 
larger program—because the PMO doesn’t bear the costs of the risk
Acquisition Program: 
Next-Generation Cruise Missile
Availability: Early next year
moral hazard  /ˈmôrəl ˈhazərd/  n. 1 (economics) lack of incentive to guard against 
risk where one is protected from its consequences 
Actual Acquisition Story (fictionalized)
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Research Approach
PMO A GATI program has a CPAF contract 
with the ability to change the 
award fee structure every six 
months.
1
7Inherent Moral Hazards in Acquisition: Improv ing Contractor Cooperation in Gov ernment As The Integrator (GATI) Programs
© 2018 Carnegie Mellon University
[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited 
distribution.
Research Approach
There are two contractors, each 
developing a subsystem, who must 
work cooperatively to produce the 
full system. 
A "Giver/Receiver" list describes 
the schedule for the areas where 
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Research Approach
The PMO wants to successfully 
achieve the program's cost, 
schedule, & performance goals, 
and to do so can 
a) measure the contractor's actions 
and performance, 
b) perform some integration 
actions themselves, and 
c) implement coordination actions 
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Research Approach
The contractors want to maximize 
their own goals, and in doing so 
they both  
a) perform various development 
activities, and 
b) send (possibly deceptive) 
performance "signals" to the PMO 
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Research Approach
While the contractors may want the 
program to succeed, they also have 
individual incentives to not 
cooperate with each other, such as 
concerns about disclosing 
proprietary information to a 
competitor, providing costly 
technical support, or agreeing on 
an interface that might simplify the 
other contractor's work, while 
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Research Approach
If a contractor doesn't cooperate, 
they may 
a) delay work and desynchronize 
the schedule, b) refuse to provide 
the data they should provide to the 
other contractor, or 
c) choose an interface that 
undermines the other—but they 
will manipulate the PMO's 
measurements to avoid detection, 
and conceal their motives to avoid 
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Research Approach
Assuming that contractors not 
cooperating on interfaces will hurt 
the program, combining the 
benefits and impacts ("utilities") to 
both the contractors and the 
overall program can produce the 
following payoffs—which form 
what's called a "coordination" 
game, where participants tend to 
end up in one of two solutions (i.e., 
"Nash equilibria")—but only one of 
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Research Approach
If the contractors' incentives are 
slightly different due to the 
program's context (e.g., the level of 
distrust between them, or the 
criticality of the IP), the utilities can 
form another game called the 
"Prisoner's Dilemma," where 
participants end up in only one 
Nash equilibrium where neither 
cooperates—
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Research Approach
To prevent these undesirable 
outcomes, the PMO can incentivize 
the contractors to cooperate, using 
award fee incentives that change 
the game to one in which the only 
Nash equilibrium serves the 
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Research Approach
Some specific solution 
"mechanisms" for contractor 
cooperation issues include "Shared 
Destiny" (all players win or lose 
based on the outcome), "Assigned 
Fault" (some win and some lose 
based on a fault determination), or 
a "Risk Pool" (a reserve fund used 
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Research Approach
The effectiveness of the solution 
approaches can be tested by 
simulating a model of each 
mechanism in the context of the 
program with its specific incentive 
values, playing out all combinations 
of moves and counter-moves into 
the projected future and evaluating 
the outcome. The most promising 
mechanisms can be piloted with 
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Research Approach Future Work
The outcomes of the piloted efforts 
can be measured in terms of: 1) 
compliance with program’s 
“Giver/Receiver” list schedule, 2) 
EVM performance and schedule 
variance, 3) defect counts from 
testing of that interface, and 4) the 
number of waivers/deviation 
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Incentive Mechanisms in Combination
Distinct types of incentives affect contractors differently—and the combined impact can be 
more effective in influencing a range of contractors sufficiently to change their behavior. 
Business: Future Business Incentives (appeal to Executive Management)
• Example: Reputation Tracking: Reputational impacts affect future business 
opportunities in the absence of award or incentive fee. 
Money: Direct Financial Incentives (appeal to Project Management)
• Example: Truth-Revealing Incentive Mechanism1 (TRIM): A sliding CPIF fee 
based on schedule (e.g., sooner completion, larger fee incentivizes early delivery. 
• Example: Shared Destiny: All teams only receive as much award fee as the 
worst team gets, so all are incentivized to help the poorest performing team.
Social: Team Networking Incentives (appeal to Project Teams)
• Example: Co-Location: Teams with greatest potential for poor cooperation are 
co-located (and kept badge-less) to foster communication and trust.
1Coughlan, Peter J., & Gates, William. (2009). Innovations in defense acquisition: asymmetric information and incentive contract design. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.
19Inherent Moral Hazards in Acquisition: Improv ing Contractor Cooperation in Gov ernment As The Integrator (GATI) Programs
© 2018 Carnegie Mellon University
[DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited 
distribution.
Acquisition Game Players
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Drivers of Acquisition PMO Behavior
What contributes to the overall performance of an acquisition program?
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Drivers of Component Performer Behavior
What contributes to the overall business of a “component performer” (e.g., contractor)?
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Mechanism-Based Incentive Alignment
How incentives can drive Acquisition Program and Component Performer behavior
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Effects of Using Government Integration Services
A Key Systems Integration Dynamic In “Growth and 
Underinvestment”1, use of 
GATI increases demand for 
government integration, 
which fulfills the CPs’ needs 
early on, but as use 
increases, CP satisfaction 
with the integration declines, 
driving growth of the 
government capability. 
Meanwhile the CP does 
more integration itself, 
optimizing the system for its 
own needs. This is 
reinforcing as the CP prefers 
its decisions to the 
government’s, undermining 
the program’s ability to meet 
its goals.
CP Satisfaction with
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1Senge, Peter M. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. New York: Doubleday/Currency.
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Composite Program Performance1
Unintended Effects of Combining Incentive Mechanisms -1
The result of combining the 
“Shared Destiny” and TRIM 
incentive mechanisms.
1Composite Program Performance = Segment Schedule Performance Index * Segment Productivity Index * Extent Global Goals are Achieved
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Unintended Effects of Combining Incentive Mechanisms -2
1Composite Program Performance = Segment Schedule Performance Index * Segment Productivity Index * Extent Global Goals are Achieved





can be analyzed and 
predicted.
Composite Program Performance1
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• Moral Hazards: Many problematic acquisition behaviors are “moral hazards”—and new moral 
hazards can (and likely will) arise with every new commitment that is made.  
• Trust and Relationships: Incentives can promote trust and be self-reinforcing—but poor trust 
and poor relationships cause a downward spiral.
• No Silver Bullet: Specific incentives can achieve specific objectives—but there is no single 
perfect incentive. 
• Roles and Incentives: Different incentive types appeal to different organizational roles. The 
most effective incentives depend on an organization’s values. 
• Multiple Types of Incentives: Combinations of incentives can be more effective across a wide 
range of organizations with unknown business values. 
• Combining Incentives: Incentives should be combined for maximum effect, but it gets 
complicated. Some incentives can undermine others.
• Evolution of Incentives: An incentive is one “weapon” in an ongoing “war,” where incentives 
become obsolete, and must evolve. 
• Modelling for Prediction: Acquisition modeling & simulation can help predict the results of 
decisions, and analyze the results of proposed policy changes. 
Key Research Insights
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